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Abstract
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-inefficient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper
shows that litigation can be the outcome of rational behavior by a litigant and her attorney. If
the attorney has more information than his client concerning the characteristics of the lawsuit,
the client can use litigation as a way of extracting information. I show that, counterintuitively,
litigation will occur only when the plaintiff is pessimistic about her prospects at trial. Even if
the plaintiff could obtain a higher payoff from bargaining than from litigation-without-bargaining,
bargaining may not occur in equilibrium. The plaintiff is more likely to sue if she is more pes-
simistic about winning damage in court and if litigation is more risky. Litigation is less likely to
occur if the plaintiff receives third party financing for litigation. Journal of Economic Literature
Classification Numbers: C78, D74, D86, K41.
Keywords: settlement-litigation decision, costs of bargaining, non-bargaining, delegation of dis-
pute resolution, risks of litigation, plaintiff-characteristic dependence, low plaintiff win rates.
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1. Introduction
Litigations are wars without bloodshed, yet more expensive and all-consuming than warfares with.
The total annual cost of tort litigation across the U.S. in 2006 comes to some $ 865.37 billion1 (6.5%
of U.S. GDP), which is more than the Pentagon budget, plus Iraq and Afghan conflicts combined;
however, less than 15 percent of that amount goes to compensate injured people (See McQuillan et
al. (2007)). In 2003, the U.K. had a 0.7% ratio of tort cost to GDP,2 the same size as its costs of
war in Iraq and Afghanistan (approx. £ 8 billion). Statistics estimate that tort cases in the U.K.
take, on average, five years to resolve and legal expenses exceed the damage paid (see NAO (2001),
Swanson (1998)). One might expect knowledge of the expensiveness of litigation to provide incentives
for litigants to engage frequently in negotiation as to avoid these expenses, and that only strong cases
are pushed towards trial, causing plaintiff win rates (the frequency that the court rule in favor of the
plaintiff) at trial to be large. However, empirical evidence3 shows that bargaining between the litigants
occurs only on an infrequent basis – the average personal injury case in the United Kingdom receives
fewer than two offers in its 5-year lifetime; while the average trial success rate of the plaintiff rests
around 43%. Further inspection of disaggregated data shows that settlement-litigation distributions
and trial win rates depend crucially on plaintiff characteristics such as the type of accident and the
way litigation is financed. Particularly, the plaintiffs are less likely to go to trial if their trial outcomes
are more predictable and if they receive financial support for litigations; the plaintiffs are more likely
to win at trial if they face less uncertainty about trial outcomes and if they receive financial support.
The theory presented in this chapter is an attempt to rigorously explain these empirically significant
observations of [1] partial bargaining4, [2] low plaintiff trial success rate and [3] party-dependent
settlement-litigation behavior.
The chapter deals with the issue of litigation versus settlement by taking as its starting point
the asymmetric information between litigants and their attorneys. It examines the plaintiff and her
attorney as an uniformed principal and an informed agent who are bargaining with another principal
– the tortfeasor’s insurer. For simplicity, I assume (as do Bebchuk (1984), Schweizer (1989), Watts
(1994) and Watanabe (2007)) that the interests of the insurer and his attorney are perfectly aligned.
So I can represent the insurer and his attorney as a single player called the “defendant”. Given
asymmetric information on various aspects of pretrial bargaining, litigation can be explained as an
instrument a plaintiff uses to extract information. Both the litigant and the attorney can be viewed
as lacking information about the case’s prospects at trial. This chapter examines the case where the
attorney has better information. This is a reasonable assumption because attorneys, via repeated
1These costs include, among others, administrative costs ($ 59 billion), claimant’s attorney costs ($ 53 billion), first-
party defense costs ($ 39 billion), deadweight costs ($ 36 billion), and dynamic costs ($ 537.37 billion). The dynamic
costs include costs of accidental deaths ($ 7.51 billion), health care expenditures ($ 124 billion), reduced access to health
care ($ 38.78 billion), and lost sales of new products from less innovation ($ 367.08 billion). See McQuillan et al. (2007).
2This ratio was 0.6% in Denmark, 0.7% in France, 0.8% in Japan, 1.0% in Belgium and in Spain, 1.1% in Germany,
and 1.7% in Italy. See Tillinghast (2006).
3Two sets of data are included in the discussion of this section: Swanson’s Taxed Cases Study (TCS) [see Swanson
(1988) and Swanson and Mason (1998)] and the Oxford Study by Harris et al. (1987).
4This term was first used by Swanson and Mason (1998). The term refers to the fact that the probability that the
plaintiff bargains with the defendant is neither zero nor one.
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and frequent litigation, acquire experience and knowledge about the statutes, precedents, and rules
of procedure and evidence which are rarely possessed by occasional plaintiffs. A key matter for us in
considering the issue is the role played by information of claim strength (i.e., defendant’s liability for
damages) in determining patterns of settlement and litigation.
The approach taken in this chapter to litigants’ settlement-versus-litigation decision under asym-
metric information is based on the work of Myerson (1979). It involves the design of a contract offer
by a plaintiff that recognizes that her attorney may have an incentive to misinform her about the
perspective of the case in order to delay settlement and increase billable hours while working less. An
incentive-compatible contract in which a plaintiff will commit to resort to costly litigation when her
case is reported to be weak can, however, be shown to be at least as good as any contract in which
the plaintiff will settle all her dispute out of court. That is, since the plaintiff does not know the
genuine strength of her case, the plaintiff must set the attorney’s reward as a function of some report
on the case prospects from the attorney, and the incentive contract must satisfy the constraint that
the attorney should have an incentive to report truthfully the information desired by the client. Be-
cause of this constraint, the settlement-versus-litigation decision can be optimal only in a constrained
sense,5 and expensive litigation results from the information asymmetry.
The major results in this chapter can be summarized as:
(a) A plaintiff will not pursue litigation when she learns from her attorney that her case is strong
and that she is likely to prevail at trial. Bargaining may not occur, even if the plaintiff could
obtain a higher payoff from bargaining than from going to trial without bargaining. The
intuition is easily conveyed: The attorney’s productivity in settlement negotiation increases
with the case strength. The plaintiff, therefore, wants to encourage the attorney to admit
that the case is strong, whenever it is true, so that the attorney will bargain hard with the
defendant to obtain a high damage award in settlement. However, to prevent the attorney from
misrepresenting the strength of the case when the case is strong, the plaintiff must somehow
‘punish’ the attorney for reporting that the case is weak. Such punishment takes the form of
pushing cases towards trial without negotiation (hence no payment to the attorney).
(b) The pattern of the plaintiff’s settlement-litigation decision depends on the probability distribu-
tion of the case strength and therefore on the risks associated with litigation and the plaintiff’s
ability to monitor the attorney. Litigation occurs more frequently if it is a priori less profitable
for the plaintiff to pursue. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The plaintiff’s prospect
at trial increases with the strength of her case. With a stronger case, it is less costly for the
attorney to obtain favorable settlement terms from the defendant. Since the plaintiff bears the
full costs of pretrial negotiation, out-of-court settlement (resp. litigation) becomes more (resp.
less) attractive an option for the plaintiff when negotiation is less costly.
(c) Litigation occurs more frequently if it is a priori more risky for the plaintiff to pursue. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. When the plaintiff’s uncertainty about trial outcome
is low, she can better monitor her attorney’s performance in settlement bargaining and the
principal-agent impediments to settlement is mitigated. Therefore, the plaintiff pursues litiga-
5This is a common result in the mechanism design literature.
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tion less often when the trial outcomes are more predictable. An implication of this result
is that institutional characteristics determining the degree of plaintiff uncertainty about trial
outcomes figure large in settlement-litigation strategies.
(d) There is another aspect of the attorney-client relationship regarding the financing of litiga-
tion that can affect a plaintiff’s incentive regarding settlement: legal aid (for both settlement
and litigation) reduces the costs inherent in representative bargaining that impede settlement.
Therefore, plaintiffs receiving legal aid go to court less often than those receiving no legal aid.
My model is able to explain key features of the U.K. tort settlement-litigation data – partial bargain-
ing, low plaintiff win rate and heterogeneity between plaintiffs: plaintiffs with less uncertainty about
trial outcomes and receiving financial assistance in litigation go to court less often than those with
higher uncertain and receiving no financial assistance. The next section provides empirical evidence
by using detailed database of 242 cases developed by Swanson(1988) from the U.K. Royal Courts of
Justice. The U.K. database contains information on the legal expenses, trial outcomes, and various
characteristics of the litigants and their attorneys, allowing direct tests of the model’s predictions.
The model is a good representation of many real civil dispute situations. The vast majority of tort,
prisoner and civil right lawsuits are characterized by the plaintiffs’ informational disadvantage vis-a`-
vis the attorneys.6 This is because attorneys, via repeated and frequent play in the litigation game,
accumulate experience and knowledge about the statutes, precedents, and rules of procedure and
evidence which are rarely possessed by occasional plaintiffs. Furthermore, In the process of pretrial
bargaining, as it relates to the decision to litigate or settle a civil dispute, attorneys exercise predomi-
nant control over and take responsibility for the dispute-resolution delegated to them by their clients.
Although clients usually participate in the litigation process, attorneys in personal injury cases often
enjoy considerable latitude in deciding how to resolve their clients’ claims in settlement negotiation.
This study therefore provides a theory that explicitly incorporates this empirically significant facet
of the dispute resolution process into the game-theoretic analysis of litigation-settlement decision.
The paper is organized as follows. I begin by reviewing the literature and by presenting evidence
on the litigation frequency and trial outcomes in UK tort liability litigation in section 2. The evidence
suggests a need to expanding existing litigation models to include the delegation of pretrial negotia-
tion. The game theoretic model is constructed in section 3: section 3.1 describes the basic model of
pretrial negotiation developed in previous work; the basic ingredients of my model are discussed in sec-
tion 3.2; the formal solution and properties of the litigant’s settlement-litigation decision are developed
and illustrated in section 3.3; section 3.4 describes the variations in the plaintiff’s settlement-litigation
pattern, corresponding to changes in her optimism/pessimism about the trial outcome; section 3.5
discusses the effect of different forms of litigation financing on plaintiff’s settlement-litigation deci-
sion; section 3.6 presents a result about how bargaining outcome and litigation incidence change with
changes in the risks associated with litigation. Section 4 concludes.
6Bebchuk (1984), Hylton (1993) and Boon (1995) make similar arguments. Using information on plaintiff and
defendant identities in over 65,000 federal civil suits drawn from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts data set,
Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) find that plaintiffs in tort, prisoner and civil right cases usually suffer a more serve
informational disadvantage than in other types of cases.
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2. Motivation
2.1. Theoretical Motivation
Two central puzzles in the U.K. tort litigation data from Swanson’s Taxed Cases Study (TCS) are the
high proportion of cases which require ultimate resolution by a court and the low likelihood of trial
success of the plaintiffs.7 These plaintiffs must pay the costs of the entire legal process, usually without
getting compensated.8 Swanson’s Taxed Cases Study (TCS)9 shows that in the tried cases (i.e., cases
that went to trial) the plaintiffs incurred on average legal expenses in the neighborhood of £5,300,
approximately 68.5% of the damage payments received by the plaintiffs in those cases. However, more
than 50% of the plaintiffs received no damage payments after having incurred a substantial amount of
legal costs. Similarly in the U.S., plaintiff trial success rate appears to be low. Waldfogel (1995), for
instance, empirically documents that the plaintiffs only win approximately 50% of the times at trial
by using data from broad variety of cases (including contract, tort, civil right and property disputes).
The decision to litigate or settle a civil dispute, as it relates to the process of pretrial bargaining,
has been the subject of extensive investigation in law and economics. Asymmetric information (AI)
models, starting with Cooter et al. (1982), P’ng (1983), Bebchuk (1984), and advanced by Reinganum
and Wilde (1986) and Nalebuff (1987), offer possible explanations of the litigation puzzle. What most
of these models have in common is that the game is formulated in extensive form and essentially
consists of a sequence of two periods. After the suit has been filed, one litigant, in the first period,
making a settlement offer which, in the second period, the other litigant either accepts or rejects.
If the last-moving litigant accepts, the case settles out of court at the proposed terms. Otherwise,
the case goes to trial. The way these models work is as follows: when one side in a legal dispute
has information that the other side does not have, incentives are created for the former to credibly
convey information to the latter; delays occur inevitably when the benefits of establishing credibility
exceed the costs of waiting; informed parties proceed to trial only when they expect to win, causing
plaintiff win rates at trial to be high. The central finding of this literature has been that the presence
of asymmetric information yields a positive probability of trial.10
Central to all these models is the informational difference about trial outcomes between the
litigants. None of the informational differences, however, has been adequately explained by any
of these models; that is, it is not yet understood why this system might generate the divergent
expectations which must be the source of these differences in perspectives. The incorporation of
the attorneys as key participants in the bargaining game provides a crucial link in the analysis of
7In the U.S. however, the vast majority of cases that are filed settle out of court and countless others are settled
even before a lawsuit is filed. Less than 4 percent of the civil cases that are filed in the U.S. state court proceed to trial.
Only 2 percent of the civil cases that are filed in the U.S. federal court proceed to trial. See Ostrom et al. (2001) p.29.
8In the British legal system the losing litigant of a civil case has to pay the winner’s court costs, in addition to her
own legal expenses. In the US as well as in many European jurisdictions, each side pays their own legal costs.
9In the U.K. the legal expenses are usually allocated to the “losing” party in the dispute. Since the reasonable legal
expenses must then be determined, a separate division of the judiciary has evolved to fulfill this function: the Taxing
Masters of the High Courts of Justice. In order to make fact-based determinations of claims for expenses, the regulations
of the High Court provide that a detailed account of the proceedings must be tendered to the Taxing Master. It was
this set of files which were consulted for the construction of the data set in Swanson (1988)’s study. Swanson named
these legal cases as “taxed cases”.
10For an excellent review of this literature, see Waldfogel (1998).
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settlement-litigation decision. It explains why a difference in perspective on a lawsuit might exist; and
how this difference might plausibly lead to inefficient litigation. To my knowledge, this paper is the
first attempt to rigorously analyze the role of the attorneys in causing the informational differences
between the litigants that give rise to expensive litigation. Early studies have also investigated the role
of lawyers in settlement and litigation. However, in these studies lawyers are not necessarily barriers
to settlement; sometimes their participation may facilitate settlement by furnishing information to
their clients,11 or by providing credibility to party communications in pretrial negotiation.12 In
another theory, the lawyer’s incentives regarding settlement depend on her fee arrangement with the
client; some fee structures are more likely than others to discourage the lawyer from seeking an early
settlement.13
Furthermore, existing AI theories do not explain the absence of bargaining (i.e., absence of settle-
ment offers in pretrial negotiation) observed in the TCS study,14 as will be elaborated in the following
section.
2.2. Empirical Motivation
The empirical features I focus on are the likelihood that the plaintiff bargains with the defendant,
the frequency of litigation and the chance that the plaintiff prevails in court in the event of a trial.15
Table 1 shows the frequency of bargaining of different types of plaintiffs. In my sample of 242 tort
cases from the U.K. Courts of Justice for the year of 1987, the majority of cases are bargained (74%)
and settled out of court (66%) for all plaintiff types. However, a significant proportion of claims (26%)
are forced to trial without bargaining.
Disaggregate data reveals, however, a more confusing picture that cannot be explained by existing
models. Table 1 shows the frequency of bargaining of different types of plaintiffs. The majority of
cases are bargained (74%) and settled out of court (66%) for all plaintiff types. The frequency of
litigation, however, appears to be highly dependent on the plaintiff’s uncertainty about trial outcomes
and on the financing of litigation. For players whose disputes are governed by customary tort law16
that is characterized by a relatively high uncertainty of trial outcomes (these are motor accident
and medical negligence cases), the frequency is 41%. Union-represented plaintiffs in workplace injury
lawsuits, who litigate under statutory labor law 17 that is characterized by a relatively low uncertainty
of trial outcomes18, settled all their claims out of court. Furthermore, for those who have inexpensive
11See Menkel-Meadow (1984).
12See Gilson and Mnookin (1994).
13See Miller (1987).
14Swanson and Mason (1998) is an exception. But Swanson and Mason did not investigate the role of agency problems
in bargaining processes.
15My data come from the files of the Taxing Masters in the U.K. Courts of Justice for the year of 1987 selected by
Timothy Swanson. See Swanson (1998) for a detailed description.
16Customary law is law not documented in the written code. It is not enacted by a legislative authority. It is an
established pattern of legal practice where courts enforce customary rules as if they had been enacted by the proper
legislative authority.
17Statutory law is written law enacted by a legislature.
18In England, the labor law which governs workplace injury disputes is largely a creature of Statute, (Acts of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom) rather than Common law. Legal outcomes under statutory law are usually more
predictable than under customary law. See O’Hara and Ribstein (2000) for a discussion on the difference in predictability
between customary law and statutory law.
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Table 1. Distribution of Litigations and Settlements by Plaintiff’s Type
All Types Privately-funded Legal aid Union assisted Union represented
Negotiated cases (%) 74% 68% 83% 71% 100%
Settled cases (%) 66% 59% 76% 63% 100%
Tried cases without
prior bargaining (%) 26% 32% 17% 29% 0%
Tried cases with
prior bargaining (%) 8% 9% 7% 8% 0%
Source. Author’s calculations using data from Taxed Cases Study by Swanson (1988).
Notes: Privately funded plaintiffs pay all their own legal expenses. Legal aid plaintiffs receive financial aid from the government
that partially covers their legal expenses. Union assisted plaintiffs receive financial assistance from trade unions that partially co-
vers their legal expenses. For union represented plaintiffs, their trade unions retain attorneys on their behalf and cover all legal
costs associated with litigation and settlement.
Table 2. Distribution of Plaintiff Trial Success Rates by Plaintiff Types
All Types Privately-funded Legal aid Union assisted
Prior Bargaining 95% 92% 100% 100%
No prior bargaining 26% 17% 43% 50%
All 43% 33% 60% 61%
Source. Author’s calculations using data from Taxed Cases Study by Swanson (1988).
Notes: The prior bargaining pool contains litigated cases that have undergone negotiation but have failed to settle.
The no prior bargaining pool contains cases that are forced to trial without negotiation. Privately funded plaintiffs p-
ay all their own legal expenses. Legal aid plaintiffs receive financial aid from the government that partially covers the-
ir legal expenses. Union assisted plaintiffs receive financial assistance from trade unions that partially covers their leg-
al expenses.
access to legal services in litigations and pretrial negotiations, such as individuals receiving legal aid,
the frequency is 24%. Whereas for privately-funded players, the frequency is 41%. Union-represented
plaintiffs in workplace injury lawsuits, who receive full reimbursement for their legal costs19, settled
all their claims out of court.
Table 2 shows the frequency of trial success for different types of plaintiffs. The empirical evidence
reveals three striking features that cannot be explained by any existing theory. First, the majority of
the cases (57%) actually brought to verdict result in a judgement in favor of the defense.20
Consequently, the court does not award any compensation in these cases. Second, these win rates
are drastically different between bargained and not-bargained cases – they are close or equal to 1 in
the bargaining pool, which are consistent with the basic implication of the asymmetric information
theories; however, they rest in the middle between 0 and 0.5 in the non-bargaining pool – an observa-
19In England, if an injury is closely related to employment conditions (workplace injury claims) or against the public
body, the plaintiff is likely to be assisted in its action by its trade-union representatives. In this case, the action is the
plaintiff’s in name only and is being conducted (and fully financed) for the plaintiff’s benefit by the union.
20Similar empirical observations were recorded by Farber and White (1991), Vidmar et al. (1998), Sieg (2000) and
Spurr (2000). Farber and White provide evidence from 252 U.S. medical malpractice cases from 1977 to 1989 and show
that the defendants have won all the cases tried to completion. Vidmar et al. report that plaintiffs prevail in 22.5%
of the California medical malpractice cases from 1991 through 1997. Using data on 8,306 medical malpractice cases in
Florida, Sieg shows that only 29% of tried cases result in a verdict for the plaintiff. Spurr (2000) provides evidence from
424 medical malpractice cases in Michigan that, the cases that went to trial are drawn disproportionately from claims
that are weak.
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Table 3. Probit Regression Parameter Estimates
Dependent variable BARGAINING RATE WIN RATE
Independent Variables
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY -0.729∗∗ -0.899∗
(0.215) (0.442)
FINANCIAL AID 0.272 † 0.760∗
(0.185) (0.372)
CONSTANT -0.036 -1.561
(0.188) (0.402)
Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.152
Observations 242 63
Source. Author’s calculations using data from Taxed Cases Study by Swanson (1988).
Notes: Values are estimated by probit equations, and standard errors are reported in pa-
rentheses. BARGAINING RATE means the likelihood that bargaining occurred before trial.
WIN RATE means the frequency that the plaintiffs prevailed at trial. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
is an indicator with value 1 if the case is medical negligence or automobile accident, 0 if
the case is workplace injury or against public body. FINANCIAL AID is an indicator with
value 1 if the plaintiff received financial support, 0 if the case was privately-financed.
† Significant at 10% level; * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level.
tion not explained by existing AI theories. Third, the win rates in the non-bargaining pool vary greatly
between different types. For those who are assisted by legal aid or receive financial support from trade
unions, the proportion winning in court is more than 40%, whereas for self-financed plaintiffs, the
proportion is around 17%.
The first column of Tables 3 reports the results of a regression model that demonstrate the
influence of the two factors – the heterogeneity in plaintiff’s uncertainty and the financing of litigation
on the incidence of bargaining. There are two important features of these results: first, for the types
of cases associated with more uncertain legal outcomes21, plaintiffs are less likely to bargain with
the defendants than plaintiffs involved in cases that are associated with less uncertainty22; second,
plaintiffs receiving legal aid from the government or financial support from trade unions are more
likely to negotiate with the defendants than privately funded plaintiffs.
The second column of Table 3 reports the results of regression models that demonstrate the influ-
ence of the plaintiff financing and the heterogeneity in the levels of uncertainty associated with legal
outcomes on the likelihood of plaintiff trial success for those cases that have not been bargained prior
to trial. The important features of these results are: first, the plaintiffs in a litigation environment
associated with less uncertainty are more likely to win in court; second, plaintiffs receiving legal aid
from the government and those receiving financial support from trade unions are more likely win in
court than privately funded plaintiffs.23
Tables 1, 2 and 3 contain the key challenges for a theory of settlement-litigation decision. First it
must clarify the phenomenon of “partial bargaining” – the empirical observation that the probability
that parties engage in settlement negotiation is neither zero nor one. Second it must elucidate why
plaintiffs would so often pursue expensive litigation when the chance of success is so low. Third it
21They are motor vehicle accidents and medical negligence cases.
22These are plaintiffs involved in workplace injury cases and cases against the public body.
23I do not discuss further the plaintiff’s settlement-litigation decision and trial success rate for the negotiated cases,
because it is not of interest in this study and the sample in the bargaining-pool is too small (the number of observations
is 19) to give empirically reliable conclusions.
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must rationalize the variation in litigation frequency across plaintiff types and identify factors that are
relevant for settlement-litigation incentives. Finally, it must explain the heterogeneity in win ratios
between different types of plaintiffs. My model is an attempt to unravel these paradoxes.
This article broadens the discussion of the strategic settlement-litigation decision. The most
important distinction between my work and previous game theoretic analysis of pretrial bargaining
is the principal-agent impediment to settlement. Previous studies ignore the fact that settlement
negotiations are costly in themselves: attorneys spend time on discovery, establishing contact, and
searching for legal precedents; they have incentive to increase the time to settlement and billable
hours by fielding unattractive bids and encouraging clients to refuse early settlement offers. My
model emphasizes the role of agency costs in bargaining processes.
3. Theoretical Analysis
3.1. Pretrial Bargaining without Attorney
The main difference between my model and previous game theoretic models of pretrial bargaining
is that my model incorporates the attorney as a key participant in the bargaining game – it focuses
on the principal-agent aspect of the problem. Before I start my analysis, however, Bebchuk’s (1984)
canonical model of settlement bargaining deserves some review. Bebchuk considers the case where a
plaintiff has been injured in a tort accident. The plaintiff then files a lawsuit against the defendant.
The plaintiff and the defendant then play a bargaining game. The bargaining game has the following
structure:
Let θ represent the strength (“legal quality” and “state of the world” are synonyms) of the plain-
tiff’s case, which reflects the likelihood that the plaintiff receives damage award at trial. The strength
of the case depends on the quality of evidence, the law defining liability and the burden of proof.
Higher values of θ indicate greater strength of the plaintiff’s case. The defendant is aware of the
strength of the claim, but the plaintiff is not.24 This is a reasonable assumption as usually the
defendant is privately informed about whether he behaved negligently while the plaintiff is not.
Following the Bayesian approach, assume that the plaintiff has some subjective prior probability
distribution for the unknown parameter θ prior to receiving any report from her attorney on the
perspective of her suit. Let θ be distributed on Θ = [θ, θ] according to a density function f( · ) with
f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Let F ( · ) be the cumulative distribution function.
If the plaintiff goes to trial, a court will conduct its own independent investigation.25 Without
loss of generality, normalize the probability that the plaintiff prevails at trial to θ and normalize the
amount of judgment (“value of damage” is a synonym) to unity.26
24P’ng (1983), Bebchuk (1984), Nalebuff (1987), Spier (1992) and Sieg (2000) make the same assumption that the
defendant has private knowledge about the outcome at trial. Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) assume that there is
asymmetric information between attorneys and clients and derive endogenously the optimal fee arrangements arising in
litigation in response to this asymmetry. But these authors did not investigate the role of agency problems in bargaining
processes.
25A variety of papers in the literature weaken or manipulate some of these assumptions. See Daughety and Reinganum
(2005).
26The model can be easily extended to a case where the size of the judgment, and not only the defendant’s liability,
is uncertain.
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Plaintiff makes settlement
demand x to defendant
-
Defendant accepts
or rejects
If defendant accepts
then case settles;
If defendant rejects
then case goes to trialxt t@x,ΘLD t@x,ΘHD0 1Attorney Negotiated Damage AwardAttroneyTime
Figure 1 Timing of Litigation without Attorney
The sequence of the game is as follows: the plaintiff makes a settlement demand, x, to the
defendant, who either agrees to pay x or refuses. Refusal means that the case proceeds to trial. Each
party must pay their own court costs, denoted k (with k > 0) for the plaintiff and K (with K > 0)
for the defendant (respectively), if bargaining fails and they go to trial. Assume that litigation has a
positive value for the plaintiff even if the case is of the lowest type, that is, θ > k for all θ ∈ [θ, θ ].27
This assumption is made to rule out the possibility that the plaintiff will not actually go to trial even
if he gets no payment whatsoever from the defendant in pretrial negotiation. The game is illustrated
in Figure 1.
To simplify the exposition, assume that the plaintiff and the defendant are risk neutral.28 The
plaintiff must decide on an optimal settlement demand, x. The plaintiff knows that the defendant
will only agree to pay x if x ≤ θ +K. The plaintiff maximizes her expected payoff by solving
max
x
x {1− F (x−K)}+
∫ x−K
θ
(θ − k)f(θ)dθ.
The first-order condition determining the optimal settlement demand x˜ is
1
k +K
=
f(x˜−K)
1− F (x˜−K) . (1)
To illustrate, consider the equilibrium for the case where θ is uniformly distributed on [12 , 1]. By
solving the problem in equation (1) above, one can show that the equilibrium settlement demand is
x˜ = 1− k. This is an equilibrium as long as k+K < 12 , so the limits on the integral are not violated.
Then, the likelihood of settlement is 1 − F (x˜ − K) = 2(k + K). This model provides a number of
implications; I list a few here. First, the plaintiff’s equilibrium settlement demand is decreasing in
her trial costs. Second, a decrease in either litigant’s trial costs leads to a reduction in the likelihood
of settlement. Third, redistribution of trial costs from one litigant to the other (that is, adjustments
in k and K, holding k +K fixed) has no impact on the likelihood of settlement.
Up to this point it has been assumed that the plaintiff cannot obtain better information about
her prospect at trial from professionals. In that case, settlement failure arises from inevitable in-
formation asymmetry. In reality, however, the plaintiff is usually able to obtain information on the
strength of her claim. Furthermore, the model so far ignores the fact that settlement negotiations are
costly in themselves: in order to negotiate, attorneys spend time on discovery, establishing contact,
and searching for legal precedents. Finally, by construction the model cannot explain the absence
27P,ng (1983), Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Spier (1992) make the same assumption. The assumption is made
to rule out the possibility that the plaintiff will not go to trial even if he get no payment whatsoever from the defendant
in pretrial bargaining.
28Bebchuk (1984), Nalebuff (1987), Spier (1992) and Sieg (2000) make the same assumption that the plaintiff is
risk-neutral.
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of bargaining observed in the TCS study. The next section incorporates these considerations into a
simple model that includes the plaintiff’s attorney as a key player in the litigation game.
3.2. Pretrial Negotiation with Attorney
My model has three players. All players are assumed to be risk-neutral. I take the same structure
as Bebchuk’s model but assume that the plaintiff retains an attorney (“agent” is a synonym) to work
on her behalf to conduct pretrial bargaining with another principal – the tortfeasor’s insurer. The
plaintiff-attorney and the defendant are aware of the strength of the claim θ, but the plaintiff is not.
I assume that f(· ) is twice differentiable and weakly increasing on Θ. For analytical convenience,
assume that d
dθ
1−F (θ)
f(θ) < 0, for all θ ∈ Θ. Several common distributions, including the uniform
distribution, satisfy this condition.29 This assumption is used to prove propositions 1 and 2.
Let γ(θ) = θ +K be the maximum amount the defendant is willing to offer to avoid litigation in
state θ, and let γ(θ) = θ− k be the minimum amount the plaintiff would be willing to accept in case
she would know θ.
Assume that, in state θ, any agreement inside of the interval [γ(θ), γ(θ)] can be achieved by the
attorney provided that he spends sufficient time (“costs” and “effort” are synonyms).30 Let t(x, θ)
denote the amount of time needed to negotiate settlement x in state θ. Furthermore, assume that
t(x, θ) is differentiable and absolutely continuous31 in θ for all x ≥ 0. I shall make three important
assumptions:
Assumption 1. For all θ ∈ Θ,
∂2
∂θ∂x
t(x, θ) < 0 for all x ∈ (γ(θ), γ(θ)]; [1.1]
t(x, θ) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, γ(θ)]; [1.2]
limx→γ(θ) t(x, θ) = +∞. [1.3]
Recall that θ represents the plaintiff’s optimism in pretrial negotiation. When θ is high (resp. low),
the plaintiff is more optimistic (resp. pessimistic) about the trial outcome. Then it is less (resp.
more) time consuming for the attorney to improve settlement terms. This is captured by assump-
tion 1.1. Assumption 1.2 is a normalization implying that it is costless for the attorney to obtain a
settlement that is (weakly) lower than the plaintiff’s trial payoff. Assumption 1.3 is a normalization
implying that it is impossible for the attorney to obtain a settlement that is (weakly) larger than the
29This condition is also satisfied by normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential, and Laplace distributions. See Bagnoli
and Bergstro¨m (2005) for a complete list and for results allowing the identification of distributions with monotone hazard
rates.
30To concentrate on the principal-agent aspects of the problem, I abstract away from any bargaining aspects of
negotiated settlement. In addition, strategic aspects of attorney choice will not be studied (see Jones (1989)). I am
grateful to Jan Boone and Suzanne Scotchmer for making this suggestion.
31The function t : Θ × IR → IR is absolutely continuous on Θ if for every positive number ε, there is a positive
number µ such that whenever a sequence of pairwise disjoint sub-intervals [θk, ϑk] of Θ satisfies
∑
k
| ϑk − θk |< µ then
∑
k
d(t(x, ϑk), t(x, θk)) < ε. Absolutely continuity of t(x, ·) ensures that the attorney’s value function is differentiable
almost everywhere and can be represented as an integral of its derivative. See Milgrom and Segal (2002) Theorem 2
(pp. 586).
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defendant’s trial payoff.
In order to keep the presentation simple I impose two regularity conditions:
Assumption 2. For all θ ∈ Θ
∂3
∂x2∂θ
t(x, θ) < 0 and ∂
3
∂x∂θ2
t(x, θ) > 0 for all x ∈ (γ(θ), γ(θ)]; [2.1]
d
dx
t(x, θ) |x=γ(θ)= 0. [2.2]
Assumption 2.1 states that the attorney’s bargaining technology exhibits diminishing marginal returns
to both time and case strength.32 This assumption is used in the proofs of Propositions 2 (i) and 3.
Assumption 2.2 states that a small but positive increase in settlement amount from γ(θ) will not lead
to increase in the attorney’s time. Since the plaintiff obtains γ(θ) at trial, this assumption implies
that the plaintiff is (strictly) worse off pursuing the case to trial than settling out-of-court in each
state of the world. This assumption is used to prove complete information solution 1.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between two different attorney time schedules t(x, θH) and
t(x, θL) in two distinct states θL and θH , where θH > θL.
Furthermore, assume that if the plaintiff forces her case to trial, the trial outcome will be inde-
pendent of the attorney’s time spent in pretrial negotiation.33
In seeking resolution, the plaintiff weights the benefits and costs of settlement and litigation and
has three basic instruments available to achieve her objective: (i) the plaintiff can decide whether to
go to trial or to engage in negotiation; (ii) if she decides to negotiate, then she will demand a sum
of settlement; and (iii) the attorney may be given a reward (“monetary transfer” is a synonym) for
handling the suit.
32See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) A8 (pp. 263) and A10 (pp. 267).
33One way to justify this assumption is as follows. The English legal profession is formally divided into two divisions,
solicitors and barristers. While solicitors usually conduct pretrial negotiation, barristers are best known for their role
as courtroom advocates. In addition, practice rules in England prohibit joint practice between barristers and solicitors.
For general discussion of the divided legal services in England, see Jackson (1977), Flood (1983) and Kritzer (1989).
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Figure 3. Timing of Litigation with Attorney
Formally, I shall describe a contract between the plaintiff and the attorney by three outcome functions
s = 〈φ, x, r〉, to be interpreted as follows. For any θˆ ∈ Θ, if the plaintiff chooses s after receiving report
θˆ, the plaintiff instructs her attorney to negotiate if φ(θˆ) = 1 and she litigates without negotiation
if φ(θˆ) = 0; If the plaintiff decides to settle her claim, then x(θˆ) is the sum of settlement she will
demand; r(θˆ) is the amount of reward the attorney receives in pretrial negotiation or in litigation.
The plaintiff can “write” litigation into any contract entered into with her attorney because it is ob-
servable and verifiable (as the damage compensation that the attorney obtains from the defendant).
Let S denote the set of contracts.
Now using the revelation principle (see Myerson (1979)), we may consider only plaintiff’s choices
under which the attorney’s report will truthfully reveal the case strength parameter θ, so the plaintiff’s
choices can be made as functions of θ. To simplify presentation, I suppose that the plaintiff designs
the contract. This assumption puts the whole bargaining power (in the pair plaintiff-attorney) on
the plaintiff’s side, although generally the plaintiff and the attorney bargain over reward and discuss
settlement-litigation strategy.34
To further simplify exposition, I focus on deterministic contracts.35
Given the plaintiff’s choice s, if the case strength parameter is θ, and if the attorney reports θ
truthfully, the attorney’s expected utility u(θ) is
u(θ) = r(θ)− t(x(θ), θ)φ(θ). (2)
If the attorney were to misrepresent the strength of the case and report θˆ, when θ is the true case
strength parameter, its expected utility would be
u(θˆ, θ) = r(θˆ)− t(x(θˆ), θ)φ(θˆ).
The attorney’s utility of the outside option is the same across the states and is normalized to be zero.
Figure 3 illustrates this game.
The plaintiff’s objective is then to select a contract s and maximize∫
Θ
{ (x(θ)− r(θ))φ(θ) + (θ − k − r(θ))(1− φ(θ)) }f(θ)dθ,
subject to
34This assumption is not meant to be realistic but rather to avoid the signalling phenomena that arise in situations
in which the informed attorney takes part in contract design. See Laffont and Tirole (1993) A10 (pp.39).
35Under the assumptions that the attorney is risk neutral and that the attorney’s cost function is monotonic, it is
not worth considering stochastic contracts, that is contracts for a given report of type draw from a nondegenerate
distribution the settlement-litigation decision, the reward the attorney receives and the settlement demand the attorney
produces. See Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Strausz (2006).
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u(θ) = max
θˆ
u(θˆ, θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ; [α]
u(θ) ≥ 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ. [β]
Here, condition (α) represents the incentive compatibility constraint. This condition formalizes the
notion that the attorney must not prefer to misrepresent the strength of the case as θˆ when the true
state is θ. Condition (β) represents the individual rationality constraint; the attorney’s utility cannot
be lower than what is obtained in an alternative lawsuit (which is normalized to zero). We shall say
a contract is feasible if it satisfies conditions (α) and (β).
3.3. Analysis of Optimal Settlement Timing
3.3.1. Preliminary Analysis: Complete Information
As a preliminary, we solve the plaintiff’s problem under complete information. Let c = 〈φc, xc, tc〉 be
the plaintiff ’s complete-information solutions. We have,
1. When the plaintiff has complete information about the strength of the case, there is no litigation:
φc(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ; and
2. When the plaintiff has complete information about the strength of the case, the attorney earns no
profit and his effort is optimal:
rc(θ) = t(xc(θ), θ) and
d
dx
t(xc(θ), θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. I shall prove that solutions 1 and 2 hold simultaneously. It follows from assumption 1.3 that
xc(θ) < γ(θ) for all θ. This immediately implies that the defendant will always accept xc(θ). This is
because if the defendant rejects xc(θ) the plaintiff will go to trial since θ > k for all θ ∈ Θ. Then the
defendant would pay γ(θ) at trial, which is more than the settlement demand. Suppose that 2 is true
so that rc(θ) = t(xc(θ), θ). Further, d
dx
t(x, θ) |x=γ(θ)= 0 for all θ ∈ Θ implies that , given any ǫ > 0,
we can find a ∆ > 0 and an s˜ ∈ S such that t(xs˜(θ), θ) < ǫ provided that θ − k < xs˜(θ) < ∆+ θ − k,
for all θ ∈ Θ. Or equivalently, there exists s˜ such that xs˜(θ)− t(xs˜(θ), θ) > θ − k, for all θ ∈ Θ. But
c is optimal implies that xc(θ)− t(xc(θ), θ) ≥ xs˜(θ)− t(xs˜(θ), θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Therefore, the plaintiff
is better off settling all her case out-of-court. Given that solution 1 holds, solution 2 is familiar from
the incentive literature. 
Of course, this contract offer to attorney is not feasible for the plaintiff when θ is unknown, because
it does not satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint (α). The attorney would have incentives to
misrepresent the strength of the claim by reporting states lower than the true θ. It will be instruc-
tive to compare this complete-information solution to the optimal litigation-settlement decision under
incomplete-information, to be derived in what follows. ‖
Example 1. Complete Information.
Let K = 1. Suppose that attorney’s cost function is given by t(x, θ) = ln(k + 1) − ln(θ + 1 − x).
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The reader can easily check that for this cost function, the optimal settlement term under complete
information is:
xc = θ, for all θ ∈ Θ,
which is increasing in θ and has range [θ, θ¯ ]. The optimal reward and attorney time are given by
rc(θ) = t(xc(θ), θ) = ln(k + 1), for all θ ∈ Θ.
This contract is not feasible for the plaintiff under incomplete information. To see this, suppose that
the attorney were to misrepresent the strength of the case and report θˆ, when θ is the true case
strength parameter. Then the attorney’s payoff is
u(θˆ, θ) = rc(θˆ)− t(xc(θˆ), θ) = ln(θ − θˆ + 1),
which is strictly decreasing in θˆ. Therefore, the attorney will always report that the strength of case
is θ. Thus, as θ is increased, the attorney’s payoff is increased, as it becomes easier to negotiate
settlement terms with the defendant. But the settlement term is unchanged for the plaintiff because
of the attorney’s misreport.
3.3.2. Settlement-Litigation Decision under Incomplete Information
Now we turn to the central part of this chapter. The objective here is to demonstrate how inefficient
litigation can arise as an instrument for the plaintiff to extract information concerning the strength of
cases from the attorney. The key point here is that if a plaintiff pushes weak cases toward trial, then
the incentive compatibility problem, embodied in equations (α), is mitigated. This occurs because
the attorney has less incentive to sell out when the cases are strong.
The first result demonstrates how a plaintiff could improve her net gain from settlement by
pushing some weak cases toward trial. The plaintiff’s optimal settlement-litigation decision has four
properties:
Proposition 1.
(i) The optimal contract s∗ entails that the plaintiff will only force weak cases to trial and do so
without bargaining with the defendant, i.e., there is a θ∗ ∈ Θ such that the plaintiff will go to
trial if θ < θ∗.
Further, the plaintiff’s unique optimal contract 〈φ∗, x∗, r∗〉 entails
(ii) The optimal cutoff level θ∗ is given by
θ∗ = x∗(θ∗)− t(x∗(θ∗), θ∗) + 1− F (θ
∗)
f(θ∗)
d
dθ
t(x∗(θ∗), θ∗) + k,
where x∗(·) is given by d
dx
t(x∗(θ), θ)− 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
∂2
∂x∂θ
t(x∗(θ), θ) = 1.
(iii) If the plaintiff decides to go to trial, the attorney’s utility is zero, i.e., u(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ [θ, θ∗].
(iv) If the plaintiff decides to settle the dispute, the attorney’s utility is
u(θ) = −
∫ θ
θ∗
{ d
dθ˜
t(x∗(θ˜), θ˜)}dθ˜ for θ ∈ [θ∗, θ].
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Proof. The proof of (i) is standard, see appendix. Let a feasible contract s ∈ S be given.36 Due to
(1), the plaintiff-attorney’s surplus in settlement is u(θ) = max
θˆ
{r(θˆ)− t(x(θˆ), θ)}. Due to envelope
theorem,37 we obtain that
d
dθ
u(θ) = − d
dθ
t(x(θ), θ).
This immediately implies that u(θ) = u(θ∗) − ∫ θ
θ∗
{ d
dθ
t(x∗(θ˜), θ˜)}dθ˜. The optimal contract on [θ, θ∗]
follows from the fact that incentive compatibility constraint is maintained when the individual ratio-
nality constraint holds in equality. So the plaintiff can maximize her expected utility without violating
conditions [α] and [β] by setting u(θ∗) = 0. ‖
The problem of the plaintiff can be written as
max
θ
{ ∫ θ
θ
(θ˜ − k)f(θ˜)dθ˜ + ∫ θ
θ
{x∗(θ˜)− t(x∗(θ˜), θ˜)− u(θ˜)}f(θ˜)dθ˜
}
. (3)
u(θ) = − ∫ θ
θ∗
d
dθ
t(x∗(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜ due to (iv) of the proposition. Integration by parts yields
∫ θ
θ∗
d
dθ˜
t(x∗(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜ =
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
d
dθ
t(x∗(θ), θ). (4)
Substituting (4) into (3) and differentiate, we obtain
θ∗ = x∗(θ∗)− t(x∗(θ∗), θ∗) + 1− F (θ
∗)
f(θ∗)
d
dθ
t(x∗(θ∗), θ∗) + k.
Furthermore, due to envelop theorem, d
dθ
{x∗(θ)− t(x∗(θ), θ) + 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
d
dθ
t(x∗(θ), θ)} = − d
dθ
{t(x∗, θ)−
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
d
dθ
t(x∗, θ)}. But d
dθ
1−F (θ)
f(θ) < 0 and
d
dθ
t(x, θ) < 0 and ∂
2
∂θ2
t(x, θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ Θ by construction.
Then − d
dθ
{t(x∗, θ)− 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
d
dθ
t(x∗(θ), θ)} < 0. It follows that expression (3) is strictly concave, so the
unique maximizer of (3) is given by the first-order condition.
It remains to determine the plaintiff’s optimal settlement demand. u(θ) = r(θ) − t(x(θ), θ).
Substituting, the plaintiff’s optimization problem on [θ∗, θ] becomes,
max
s∈S
∫ θ
θ∗
{ x(θ)− t(x(θ), θ) +
∫ θ
θ∗
d
dθ˜
t(x(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜ }f(θ)dθ. (5)
Integration by parts yields
∫ θ
θ∗
{
∫ θ
θ∗
d
dθ˜
t(x(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜}f(θ)dθ =
∫ θ
θ∗
{[1− F (θ)] d
dθ
t(x(θ), θ)}dθ.
Hence, ∫ θ
θ∗
d
dθ˜
t(x(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜ =
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
d
dθ
t(x(θ), θ). (6)
Substituting (6) into (5), the plaintiff’s optimization problem then becomes
max
s∈S
∫ θ
θ∗
{ x(θ)− t(x(θ), θ) + 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
d
dθ
t(x(θ), θ) }f(θ)dθ. (7)
36As defined in Section 3.2, a contract is called ‘feasible’ if it satisfies conditions (α) and (β).
37See Milgrom and Segal (2002) for a general formulation of the envelope theorem.
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Differentiate with respect to x yields, in the optimal contract
d
dx
t(x∗(θ), θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
∂2
∂x∂θ
t(x∗(θ), θ) = 1. (8)
By construction expression (7) is strictly concave, so the unique maximizer of (7) is given by the
first-order condition. 
A contract s∗ that maximizes the plaintiff’s expected payoff is called the optimal contract. In the
optimal contract, x∗(θˆ) is the sum of settlement the plaintiff will demand after she receive report θˆ
from the attorney. Facing the dual problem of expensive, jackpot-like litigation and informational
disadvantage against her attorney, the plaintiff uses one problem to solve another. The optimal cutoff
level θ∗ partitions Θ into two regions. Inefficient litigation (resp. efficient settlement) occurs whenever
the strength of the case is below (resp. beyond) θ∗. In equilibrium, there must be no unexploited
arbitrage opportunity for the plaintiff: at θ∗ her net gain from going to trial (i.e., θ∗ − k) must equal
to her gain from settling her claim (i.e., x∗(θ∗)− t(x∗(θ∗), θ∗) + 1−F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
d
dθ
t(x∗(θ∗), θ∗)).
Existing theories uniformly predict that, under asymmetric information (AI), informed parties
proceed to trial only when they expect a high likelihood of winning.38 I predict the exact opposite:
upon receiving truthful report concerning the prospects of their suits, ‘informed’ plaintiffs proceed to
trial only when they expect a low likelihood of winning, causing plaintiff win rates at trial to be low.
In this way, pretrial settlement selects likely plaintiff winners from the filed pool, causing a tendency
towards low plaintiff win rates at trial. If we compare this to the complete-information solutions
1 and 2 from an ex post point of view, it may seem inefficient and paradoxical for the plaintiff to
ever force weak cases to trial. To understand why this may be optimal, observe that the plaintiff
wants to encourage the attorney to admit that the case is strong, whenever it is true, so that the
attorney will bargain hard with the defendant to obtain a high damage award in settlement. But
to prevent the attorney from misrepresenting the strength of the case when the case is strong, the
plaintiff must somehow ‘punish’ the attorney for reporting that the case is weak. Such punishment
takes the form of pushing cases towards trial without negotiation (hence no payment to the attorney).
Example 2. Incomplete Information.
We continue from Example 1. Let us further assume that θ is uniformly distributed on [a, 1], so that
f(θ) = 1/(1−a). Suppose the plaintiff’s trial costs, k, are sufficiently low, so that k2 ≤ 1−a. Due to
proposition 2, one can show that the optimal cutoff level is θ∗ = 1−k2. Thus the likelihood of trial is
F (1− k2) = 1− k2/(1− a). The optimal settlement demand is x∗(θ) = θ− (1− θ) 12 if θ ∈ [1− k2, 1],
which is increasing in θ. A number of implications arise: First, the likelihood of settlement is in-
creasing in the plaintiff’s trial costs. Second, an improvement in the plaintiff’s knowledge about her
prospects at trial (captured by an increase in a) leads to an increase in the likelihood of settlement.
Third, the plaintiff’s settlement demand is increasing in her case strength.
38See Waldfogel (1998) for an excellent summary of this literature. Waldfogel (1998) presents empirical evidence from
over 65,000 federal civil cases, indicating that the settlement process (the selection of cases for trial) does not obey
the basic implications of these AI theories. However, Waldfogel does not provide rigorous explanations to justify his
empirical findings.
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3.4. ‘Risk-Classes’: Ranking of Litigation Lotteries
Now we arrive at the principal results of the chapter. My objective here is to show that the plaintiff’s
settlement-litigation decision necessarily depends on the risks inherent in the legal process and the
plaintiff’s prior information about her prospects at trial. Particularly, it is shown that when the
plaintiff is more pessimistic about her trial outcome, i.e., the distribution of case strength has relatively
more probability mass to the left, her attorney would bargain harder in pretrial negotiation and obtain
more favorable settlement terms from the defendant. The plaintiff litigates more frequently when her
case is a priori weaker.
Plaintiffs who share a common prior distribution function are called a ‘risk-class’. We want to
consider a group of plaintiffs that consists of a number of risk-classes and analyze the implications
of alternative settlement-litigation decisions in the presence of such heterogeneity. First we formalize
the notion that one prior distribution has a higher expected case strength than another. My approach
here is a direct application of the theory of Stochastic-Dominance.39
3.4.1. Ranking of litigation lotteries
Consider two probability distribution functions, F1 and F2, both satisfying Fi(θ) = 0, Fi(θ¯) = 1 and
Fi(θ) is weakly increasing in θ, i = 1, 2. The conditional probability that the plaintiff’s case strength
is θ (given that her case is stronger than θ), λi(θ) ≡ fi(θ)1−Fi(θ) , is termed the hazard-rate associated
with Fi(θ). We say that F1 first-order stochastically (strictly) dominates F2 if F1(θ) < F2(θ) for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ). The following definition is central to the analysis of this section.
Definition 1 (Hazard-rate Dominance) : We say that F1 (strictly) dominates F2 in terms of hazard
rate if λ1(θ) < λ2(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ).
In words, hazard rate dominance implies that, the rate of increase of the plaintiff’s chance of having
a better case (i.e., d
dθ
ln(1−F (θ)) = − f(θ)1−F (θ) ), is larger at all possible case strength with distribution
1 than with distribution 2. Now let’s explore two important implications of Definitions 2 and 3.
Lemma 1.1. If F1 dominates F2 in hazard rate, then F1 first order stochastically dominates F2.
Proof. The proof is standard, see appendix B.
Lemma 1.2. If F1 dominates F2 in hazard rate, then
∫
Θ θf1(θ)dθ >
∫
Θ θf2(θ)dθ.
Proof. By Lemma 1.1, if F1 dominates F2 in hazard rate, then F1 < F2 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). Since
F1 ≥ 0 and F2 ≥ 0, integration by parts yield∫
Θ
F1(θ)dθ <
∫
Θ
F2(θ)dθ if and only if 1−
∫
Θ
θf1(θ)dθ < 1−
∫
Θ
θf2(θ)dθ
and therefore
∫
Θ
F1(θ)dθ <
∫
Θ
F2(θ)dθ if and only if
∫
Θ
θf1(θ)dθ >
∫
Θ
θf2(θ)dθ.
We obtain the conclusion of the lemma. 
39I am grateful to Jan Boone and Eric van Damme for suggesting me to apply the theory of Stochastic-Dominance in
analyzing the dependence of settlement-litigation decision on the risks inherent in the legal process.
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In words, lemma 1.2 states that the strength of the plaintiff’s case is a priori higher with distribution
1 than with 2. Following Lemma 1.2, we say that the plaintiff is more optimistic about her trial
outcome under F1 than under F2, if F1 dominates F2 in hazard rate.
3.4.2. Risk-class settlement-litigation pattern
Let θ∗i denote the optimal cutoff level, corresponding to distribution i = 1, 2. The equilibrium levels of
settlement and attorney surplus are denoted as x∗i and u
∗
i , respectively. To further simplify notation,
write Ω∗ ≡ [θ∗1, θ] ∩ [θ∗2, θ].
My next proposition states a comparative-static result about how the optimal cutoff level, optimal
settlement demand, attorney’s payoff, equilibrium probability of litigation and plaintiff’s probability
of winning at trial change with changes in the distribution of plaintiff’s optimism about her trial
outcome. This comparative static is important for empirical work, since it leads to counterintuitive
and testable predictions about how bargaining outcome and litigants’ welfare vary with changes in
policy that affect trial outcomes.
Let ω∗i =
∫ θ∗i
θ θfi(θ)dθ/Fi(θ
∗
i ) denote the plaintiff’s equilibrium (conditional) probability of winning
at trial, corresponding to distribution i = 1, 2.40
Proposition 2. If the plaintiff is more optimistic about her trial outcome under F1 than under
F2, then
(i) θ∗1 > θ
∗
2;
(ii) x∗1(θ) < x
∗
2(θ) for all θ ∈ Ω∗;
(iii) u∗1(θ) < u
∗
2(θ) for all θ ∈ Ω∗;
(iv) F1(θ
∗
1) < F2(θ
∗
2); and
(v) ω∗1 > ω
∗
2.
Proof. I will start by proving (ii) of the proposition. Expression (7) is a strictly concave function
in x, so∫
Ω∗
{ x∗i (θ)− t(x∗i (θ), θ) +
1− Fi(θ)
fi(θ)
d
dθ
t(x∗i (θ), θ) }fi(θ)dθ >∫
Ω∗
{ x∗j (θ)− t(x∗j (θ), θ) +
1− Fi(θ)
fi(θ)
d
dθ
t(x∗j (θ), θ) }fi(θ)dθ, for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Adding the inequalities describing these maximum properties, we obtain for all θ ∈ Ω∗
{1− F2(θ)
f2(θ)
− 1− F1(θ)
f1(θ)
} d
dθ
t(x∗2(θ), θ) > {
1− F2(θ)
f2(θ)
− 1− F1(θ)
f1(θ)
} d
dθ
t(x∗1(θ), θ).
Due to Assumption 1.1, d
dθ
t(x, θ) is strictly decreasing in x. Further, hazard rate dominance implies
that 1−F2(θ)
f2(θ)
− 1−F1(θ)
f1(θ)
< 0. Therefore, x∗2(θ) > x
∗
1(θ) for all θ ∈ Ω∗ as required.
It remains to comparative the attorney’s equilibrium surplus u∗1(θ) and u
∗
2(θ). If x
∗
1(θ) < x
∗
2(θ)
for all θ ∈ Ω∗ then − d
dθ
t(x∗1(θ˜), θ˜) < − ddθ t(x∗2(θ˜), θ˜) for all θ ∈ Ω∗, by Assumption 1.1. Integrating
40Notice that
∫ θ∗
i
θ
θfi(θ)dθ is the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial under Fiinequilibrium; Fi(θ
∗
i ) is the
probability that the case will go to trial in equilibrium.
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both sides of the inequality, we get − ∫Ω∗{ ddθ t(x∗1(θ˜), θ˜)}dθ < −
∫
Ω∗{ ddθ t(x∗2(θ˜), θ˜)}dθ. The last in-
equality implies that u∗1(θ) < u
∗
2(θ) for all θ ∈ Ω∗ due to (iv) of Proposition 1.
It remains to show that θ∗1 > θ
∗
2. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step A. u∗1(θ
∗
1) = u
∗
2(θ
∗
2) = 0 due to (ii) of proposition 2.
Step B. u∗2(θ) > u
∗
1(θ) for all θ ∈ Ω∗ implies that u∗2(θ∗1) > 0 by step A.
Step C. u∗2(·) is continuous and monotone increasing on [θ∗2, θ] due to (iii) of proposition 2; further,
u∗2(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ∗2] due to (ii) of proposition 2. Therefore, u∗2(θ∗2) = 0 and u∗2(θ∗1) > 0
implies θ∗2 < θ
∗
1 (see Figure 4).
Therefore, we obtain that if u∗1(θ) < u
∗
2(θ) for all θ ∈ Ω∗, then θ∗1 > θ∗2. This together with proposi-
tion 2 (iii) imply θ∗1 > θ
∗
2.
Now turning to the proof of (iv) of Proposition 2. Due to (iii) of proposition 1, u∗1(θ
∗
1) = u
∗
2(θ
∗
2) = 0.
Therefore
1− F1(θ∗1)
f1(θ∗1)
d
dθ
t(x∗1(θ
∗
1), θ
∗
1) =
1− F2(θ∗2)
f2(θ∗2)
d
dθ
t(x∗2(θ
∗
2), θ
∗
2). (9)
Due to (iii) of proposition 1, x∗1(θ
∗
1) = x
∗
1(θ
∗
2) = 0. In addition, by construction,
d
dθ
t(x∗i (θ), θ) is
increasing in θ. Hence, if θ∗1 > θ
∗
2 then
d
dθ
t(0, θ∗1) >
d
dθ
t(0, θ∗2). Since
d
dθ
t(0, θ∗1) < 0 and
d
dθ
t(0, θ∗2) < 0,
from (8) we have
1− F1(θ∗1)
f1(θ∗1)
>
1− F2(θ∗2)
f2(θ∗2)
if and only if
d
dθ
ln(1− F1(θ∗1)) >
d
dθ
ln(1− F2(θ∗2)).
Since d
dθ
ln(1− F1(θ∗1)) ≥ 0 and ddθ ln(1− F2(θ∗2)) ≥ 0, we have∫
Θ
d
dθ
ln(1− F1(θ∗1))dθ >
∫
Θ
d
dθ
ln(1− F2(θ∗2))dθ if and only if ln(1− F1(θ∗1)) > ln(1− F2(θ∗2)).
Since ln(·) is monotone increasing, we have F1(θ∗1) < F2(θ∗2) as required (see Figure 5).
It remains to show that ω∗1 > ω
∗
2. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step A. [θ, θ∗i ] ⊂ (0, 1) by construction. Further, Fi(θ) < 1 ∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ∗i ]. So
∫ θ∗i
θ Fi(θ)dθ < 1, i = 1, 2.
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Step B. Due to Proposition 4, F2(θ
∗
2) > F1(θ
∗
1) if and only if
(F2(θ
∗
2)− F1(θ∗1))(1−Max{
∫ θ∗
2
θ
F2(θ)dθ),
∫ θ∗
1
θ
F1(θ)dθ}) > 0.
But F2(θ
∗
2)(1−
∫ θ∗
1
θ F1(θ)dθ)− F1(θ∗1)(1−
∫ θ∗
2
θ F2(θ)dθ)
> (F2(θ
∗
2)−F1(θ∗1))(1− Max{
∫ θ∗
2
θ F2(θ)dθ),
∫ θ∗
1
θ F1(θ)dθ}) implies that
F2(θ
∗
2)(1−
∫ θ∗
1
θ F1(θ)dθ) > F1(θ
∗
1)(1−
∫ θ∗
2
θ F2(θ)dθ).
Step C. Integration by parts yields 1− ∫ θ∗iθ Fi(θ)dθ = ∫ θ
∗
i
θ θfi(θ)dθ. Substituting and rearranging, we
have
∫ θ∗
1
θ θf1(θ)dθ/F1(θ
∗
1) >
∫ θ∗
2
θ θf2(θ)dθ/F2(θ
∗
2) and the proposition follows. 
The intuition of the comparative statics of the first result is as follows. Since with a low settlement
the plaintiff cannot tell whether her case was weak or her attorney “sold out”, the attorney uses the
court as an “auditor” to help him to verify to his client that the case was indeed lack of merits. With
a better distribution, the plaintiff becomes more optimistic about her prospects at trial. Hence she
is less easily convinced when the attorney says “times are tough”. In this way, more strong cases are
pushed towards trial as they more often fail to meet the optimism of the plaintiff.
The second result of Proposition 2 means that, hard bargaining takes place when the plaintiff
believes her case to be weak: she would demand more (resp. less) damage award from the defendant
in settlement if she is more pessimistic (resp. optimistic) about her prospects at trial. In other words,
an aggressive bargaining strategy (i.e., x∗2(θ) > x
∗
1(θ)) reflects that plaintiff expect her case to be
weak (captured by
∫
Θ θf2(θ)dθ <
∫
Θ θf1(θ)dθ).
The third result of Proposition 2 states that the attorney earns less (resp. more) surplus when the
plaintiff is more optimistic (resp. pessimistic) about her prospects at trial. The intuition underlying
the comparative statics is as follows. The plaintiff obtains settlement payment achieved by the
attorney but has to compensate the attorney for his time spent on the case. Further, in order to
convince the attorney to reveal the true case strength, the plaintiff has to pay an informational
rent. Since the attorney’s productivity improves with the strength of the case, he is a priori more
productive under F1 than under F2. It is therefore harder for the attorney to convince the plaintiff
that he needs to be compensated more for his time under F1 than under F2.
The fourth result of Proposition 2 states that the probability of trial is decreasing in the uninformed
player’s expected trial return (i.e.,
∫
Θ θf(θ)dθ). This result stands sharply in contrast with those
obtained from models that restrict attention to information asymmetry and strategic interactions
between litigants (see Bebchuk (1984) and Spier (1992)). Although this surprising result may seem
counterintuitive at first sight, its logic can be easily explained: the magnitude of expected trial
return reflects the productivity of the attorney. The better the plaintiff’s prospects at trial, the more
optimistic the plaintiff is, the less costly it becomes for the attorney to obtain favorable settlement
terms from the defendant. Since the plaintiff bears the full costs of negotiation, settlement (resp.
litigation) becomes a more (resp. less) attractive option when negotiation is less costly.
The last result of the proposition means that, given that litigation occurs, the plaintiff is more likely
to win with a better distribution. With a better distribution, the plaintiff litigates less often (F1(θ
∗
1) <
F2(θ
∗
2)) but brings more strong cases to trial (θ
∗
1 > θ
∗
2).
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Example 3. Stochastic Dominance.
Continuing from Example 1, let us further assume that θ is uniformly distributed on [a, 1] with
distribution F1, and uniformly distributed on [b, 1] with distribution F2, where 0 < b < a < 1.
F1 thus first order stochastically dominates F2. From the results of example 2, we have that the
equilibrium likelihoods of trial are
F1(θ
∗
1) = 1−
k2
1− a < 1−
k2
1− b = F2(θ
∗
2).
The plaintiff’s conditional probabilities of winning are
ω∗1 =
1
2
(1 + a− k2) > 1
2
(1 + b− k2) = ω∗2.
3.5. Financial Aid
Up to this point, it has been assumed that the litigation is privately funded. In that case, litigation
results when the informational rent is too high for the plaintiff to bear. The objective of this section is
to understand the effect of such financial aid on the likelihood of settlement. It is shown that financial
assistance (for both pre-litigation settlement and litigation) reduces the costs inherent in principal-
agent problem between the plaintiff and her attorney, mitigates the negative effect of information
asymmetry, thereby facilitates efficient settlement.
Formally, let 1− ̺ (with ̺ ∈ [0, 1]) denote the proportion of legal costs financed by a third party
(e.g. a trade union or legal aid funds) in settlement and litigation. Suppose that if the plaintiff decides
to settle all her cases out of court, then the feasible contract p = 〈φp, xp, rp〉 is chosen in the optimum
solution, and let
πp =
∫
Θ
{xp(θ)− ̺ rp(θ)}f(θ)dθ
denote the plaintiff’s payoff under contract p.
Further, suppose that if the plaintiff chooses to litigate a fraction of her cases, some feasible
contract q = 〈φq, xq, rq〉 will be chosen in the optimum solution. The corresponding payoff is
πq =
∫ θq
θ
{θ − ̺ k}f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θq
{xq(θ)− ̺ rq(θ)}f(θ)dθ.
Definition 2 (Incentive to Settle): The plaintiff’s incentive to settle is defined as
δ(̺) ≡ πp − πq.
Clearly, when δ(̺) > 0 the plaintiff is better off settling all her claims out of court; when δ(̺) < 0
the plaintiff would have incentive to force some of her weak cases to trial.
Proposition 3. For any distribution F , there exists ˜̺> 0 such that for all ̺ < ˜̺, δ(̺) > 0. That
is, the plaintiff is (strictly) better off settling all her cases provided that her claim
is sufficiently aided, irrespective of the magnitude of risks in litigation.
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Figure 6. Financial Aid Discourages Litigation
Proof. Suppose that δ(1) < 0, i.e., when the plaintiff’s claim is privately funded, the plaintiff
is strictly better off using contract 〈φq, xq, rq〉. But
δ(0) =
∫
Θ
xp(θ)f(θ)dθ −
{ ∫ θq
θ
θf(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θq
xq(θ)f(θ)dθ
}
.
On reflection it is clear that, xp(θ) = xq(θ) for all θ ∈ [θq, θ¯]. Then,
δ(0) =
∫ θq
θ
{xp(θ)− θ}f(θ)dθ.
However, there exists a feasible contract p such that xp(θ) > θ by construction. Hence, δ(0) > 0.
Since δ(·) is continuous on [0, 1], by intermediate value theorem we can find a ˜̺ ∈ [0, 1] such that
δ(˜̺) = 0. Further since δ(·) is monotonically decreasing in ̺, it follows that δ(̺) > 0 for all ̺ ∈ [0, ˜̺]
as required (see Figure 6). 
Proposition 3 implies that for the types of people and legal matters that would be sufficiently covered
by third party financing, settlement will always occur irrespective of the plaintiff’s prior information
and the direct trial costs. The intuition underlying the comparative statics is as follows. Litigation is
costly for the plaintiff. However, in order to effectively monitor her attorney’s performance in settle-
ment negotiation when the attorney has more information than her concerning the characteristics of
the lawsuit, the plaintiff uses litigation as a device for extracting information. Third party financing
mitigates the cost of information asymmetry inherent in representative bargaining. Therefore, plain-
tiffs receiving financial support, go to court less often than those receiving no financial support. ‖
3.6. Varying Uncertainty Levels: An Example
I now turn to an example in which the plaintiff’s uncertainty about her trial outcome is represented
by the spread of a uniform distribution. My purpose here is to show that it is possible for the model
to reproduce some key features of the data when we make plausible assumptions about the model’s
parameters. I use the uniform distribution, since in this case the equilibrium can be derived in closed
form. Numerical calculations with other distributions such as a truncated normal distribution, suggest
that my distributional assumption is not crucial to the results.
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Figure 7. Varying Uncertainty Levels (µ = 0.5, k = 0.33, θ = 0.5)
To illustrate our optimal solution, let us continue from Example 1. Suppose that θ is uniformly
distributed on [µ−d, µ+d] so θ has a mean of µ and a variance of d2/3. Thus, by varying d, I can vary
the level of uncertainty without changing the mean of the distribution. In particular, the standard
deviation increases linearly from 0 as d increases from 0. I refer to d as the level of uncertainty.
Further I assume that k + d ≤ µ ≤ 1− d.
My last proposition states a comparative-static result about how bargaining and litigation out-
comes change with changes in the level of uncertainty. This comparative static is consistent with the
literature.
Proposition 6. In the equilibrium with uniform uncertainty with t(x, θ) = ln(k+1)− ln(θ+1−x),
(i) The equilibrium probability of trial is
F (θ∗) =


0 if 0 ≤ d ≤ 12k2,
1− k22d if 12k2 < d ≤ 12 − k,
1− k21−2k if d > 12 − k.
(ii) The equilibrium settlement amount is x∗(θ) = θ−√µ+ d− θ, for θ ∈ [θ∗, µ+d],
where θ∗ = µ+ d− k2 if d > 12k2 and θ∗ = µ− d if d ≤ 12k2.
(iii) In the incidence of a trial, the plaintiff wins with probability ω∗ = µ− k2.
Proof. It follows from result (ii) of Proposition 1 that the optimal cutoff level is given by
θ∗ = µ + d − k2. d
dx
t(x∗(θ), θ) = 1/(1 − x∗(θ) + θ). ∂2
∂x∂θ
t(x∗(θ), θ) = −1/(1 − x∗(θ) + θ)2.
1 − F (θ)/f(θ) = µ + d − θ. Substituting into equation (50), and we obtain (ii). (i) and (iii) fol-
low by construction. 
One critical parameter that cannot be estimated directly from the data is the level of uncertainty d.
It is important, therefore, to look at how the bargaining outcome changes with the level of uncertainty
increases from 0. A remarkable feature of this model is that likelihood of settlement depend only on
d and k but not on the expected trial outcome or any other parameters of the model. Assume trial
costs of 0.33 and mean prior probability winning of 50 percent. The likelihood of litigation increases
from 0 to 67 percent as we move from little uncertainty to maximal uncertainty (see Figure 7).
The equilibrium settlement amount is decreasing in the mean and dispersion of probability, in-
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creasing in θ (holding constant the distribution of probability) but invariant to trial costs k. With
higher risk it is more expensive for the plaintiff to negotiate settlement payment via her attorney,
implying that the plaintiff will demand less in settlement.
Now consider how the plaintiff’s ex post probability of winning varies with the level of her uncer-
tainty. The plaintiff’s win rate is insensitive to her uncertainty. Figure 6 shows that for trial costs
of 0.33 and mean prior probability of winning of 50 percent, the plaintiff’s equilibrium win rate is
fixed at 38.9 percent. This occurs because a proportional increase in likelihood of litigation following
an increase in the plaintiff’s uncertainty results in an equal proportional increase in the strength of
litigated cases.
4. Conclusion
My main observation is that when the plaintiff has an informational disadvantage vis-a`-vis her
attorney concerning the strength of her lawsuit and her chance of winning at trial, the plaintiff can use
litigation as an instrument for extracting information. But, counterintuitively, litigation will occur
only when the plaintiff is pessimistic about her prospects at trial. The plaintiff is more likely to sue
if she is more pessimistic about winning the case. This is because, the attorney “passes the buck” to
the court provided that his client may not believe him if he says “times are hard” and that he may
be blamed for a poor performance. This, in turn, is a rational strategy for the plaintiff to pursue
because if she does not commit to litigating her weak cases she may encourage “selling out” by her
attorney. In this way, pretrial settlement selects likely plaintiff winners from the filed pool, causing a
tendency towards low plaintiff win rates at trial.
Two factors are crucially important in determining the plaintiff’s settlement-litigation decision:
the level of uncertainty associated with the legal outcomes and the financing of litigation. Pre-
dictability of legal outcome improves the plaintiff’s ability to monitor her attorney’s performance,
and therefore mitigates the principal-agent problem inherent in representative negotiation and facili-
tates successful settlement. Hence, more experienced plaintiffs go to court less often. There is another
aspect of attorney-client relationship regarding the financing of litigation that can affect a plaintiff’s
incentive to litigate: legal aid reduces the costs inherent in representative bargaining thereby pro-
moting efficient settlement. Therefore, plaintiffs receiving legal aid in litigation, go to court less often
than those receiving no legal aid.
There are three important extensions to this research. The first is to introduce renegotiation
possibilities into the analysis. After a report from the attorney on the strength of her case, the
plaintiff usually has option to change her litigation-settlement decision while proposing a change in
the attorney’s compensation scheme. Since the attorney will take these into account, renegotiation
may erode the commitment effect of litigation. The second extension is to introduce moral hazard
on the part of the attorney in the litigation stage. In my analysis, the trial outcome is not influenced
by the settlement-attorney’s effort. This might not be a plausible assumption for the some systems.
For instance, in the American legal system the trial outcome is usually a function of effort by the
attorneys who handle both pretrial negotiation and litigation. Then it will be efficient to have a
division of rents between the plaintiff and the attorney for litigated cases. This might erode the effect
of litigation as a tool for the plaintiff to monitor her attorney’s performance in settlement negotiation.
The third extension is to consider the principal-agent problem on both sides of the bargaining table.
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In my model, information asymmetry only exists on the plaintiff side. In principle, this setting can
be extended by allowing also the defendant to have informational disadvantage vis-a`-vis the defense
lawyer. In this case, however, the characterization of the equilibrium becomes more complicated
because two-sided delegation leads to a four-person bargaining game. This poses a challenge for
future research.
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5. Appendix
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 (i).
Given that the plaintiff chooses 〈φ, x, r〉, if the case strength is θ, and if the attorney reports θ truthfully, its
expected profit u(θ) is u(θ) = r(θ) − t(x(θ), θ)φ(θ); if the attorney were to misrepresent the strength of the
case and report θˆ, when θ is the true strength of the case, its expected payoff is u(θˆ, θ) = r(θˆ)− t(x(θˆ), θ)φ(θˆ).
Condition (α) requires that
u(θ) ≥ u(θˆ, θ) = u(θˆ) + φ(θˆ)[t(x(θˆ), θˆ)− t(x(θˆ), θ)]. (10)
Thus,
φ(θˆ)[t(x(θˆ), θˆ)− t(x(θˆ), θ)] ≤ u(θ)− u(θˆ) ≤ φ(θ)[t(x(θ), θˆ)− t(x(θ), θ)], (11)
where the second inequality follows from the analogue of (11) with the roles of θ and θˆ reversed. Then θ > θˆ
implies that t(x(θˆ), θˆ) > t(x(θˆ), θ) and t(x(θ), θˆ) > t(x(θ), θ) since d
dθ
1−F (θ)
f(θ) < 0, for all θ ∈ Θ; now suppose
in negation that φ(θ) < φ(θˆ). By construction of the characteristic function, we must have that φ(θ) = 0 and
φ(θˆ) = 1. But then
φ(θˆ)[t(x(θˆ), θˆ)− t(x(θˆ), θ)] = t(x(θˆ), θˆ)− t(x(θˆ), θ) > 0 = φ(θ)[t(x(θ), θˆ)− t(x(θ), θ)]
which is a contradiction to (46). Therefore, there exists a θ∗ ∈ Θ such that for all θ ≥ θ∗, φ∗(θ) = 1 and for all
θ < θ∗, φ∗(θ) = 0. 
Appendix B
Proof of lemma 1.1.
Since F1(θ) 6= 1 and F2(θ) 6= 1 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ), it follows that
f1(θ)
1− F1(θ) <
f2(θ)
1− F2(θ) if an donly if
d
dθ
ln(1− F1(θ)) > d
dθ
ln(1− F2(θ)) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ).
Integrate both sides of the inequality, we have
∫ θ
θ
d
dθ˜
ln(1− F1(θ˜))dθ˜ >
∫ θ
0
d
dθ˜
ln(1− F2(θ˜))dθ˜, for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). (12)
But
∫ θ
θ
d
dθ˜
ln(1− F1(θ˜))dθ˜ = ln(1− Fi(θ)), i = 1, 2. Inequality (54) thus becomes
ln(1− F1(θ)) > ln(1− F2(θ)) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ).
Since ln(·) is monotone increasing, it follows that 1 − F1(θ) > 1 − F2(θ) or equivalently F1(θ) < F2(θ) for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ). 
Appendix C
Dropping the suit.
Let’s now assume that θ < k for some θ ∈ Θ and allow the plaintiff to drop her claim upon receiving report
from the attorney on the case strength.
Definition 3 (settlement-litigation-dropping decision): For any θˆ in Θ, provided that the attorney reports
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that the strength of the claim is θˆ, a settlement-litigation-dropping decision ϕ : Θ → {−1, 0, 1} is a function
that is defined to be
ϕ(θˆ) =


1 if the plaintiff instructs her attorney to negotiate;
0 if the plaintiff litigates without negotiation;
−1 if the plaintiff drops her case.
Further, let
θ∗∗ := max
θ
{ ∫ θ
k
(θ˜ − k)f(θ˜)dθ˜ + ∫ θ
θ
{x∗∗(θ˜)− t(x∗∗(θ˜), θ˜)− 1−F (θ˜)
f(θ˜)
d
dθ˜
t(x∗∗(θ˜), θ˜)}f(θ˜)dθ˜
}
. (13)
If the plaintiff drops her lawsuit, she will receive no damage award. The net expected gain for the plaintiff
from dropping the case would be ∫ θ
θ
r(θ)ϕ(θ)f(θ)dθ.
All other definitions and assumptions remain unchanged. Figure 8 illustrates the game.
Plaintiff hires
attorney
Attorney
reports state θˆ
to plaintiff
-
Plaintiff instructs
attorney to make
demand x(θˆ); or
goes to trial without
negotiation; or
drops the case
Defendant
accepts or rejects
If defendant accepts
then case settles;
If defendant rejects
then case goes to trial
Time
x
t
t@x,ΘLD t@x,ΘHD0 1Attorney Negotiated Damage Award
Attroney
Time
Figure 8. Timing of Litigation with Attorney (dropping cases)
The equilibrium takes a simple form. If θ is sufficiently low (below k), the plaintiff decides to drop the case;
if θ is sufficiently high (greater than a cutoff level θ∗∗, the plaintiff decides to settle; otherwise (k < θ ≤ θ∗∗)
The following proposition is an extension of Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. The plaintiff’s optimal contract 〈φ∗∗, x∗∗, r∗∗〉 entails
(i) The plaintiff will bargain with the defendant and settle the dispute if θ ≥ θ∗∗, where θ∗∗ is given by
θ∗∗ = x∗∗(θ∗∗)− t(x∗∗(θ∗∗), θ∗∗) + 1−F (θ∗∗)
f(θ∗∗)
d
dθ
t(x∗∗(θ), θ∗∗) + k.
with x∗∗(·) given by d
dx
t(x∗∗(θ), θ)− 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
∂2
∂x∂θ
t(x∗∗(θ), θ) = 1. She will go to trial if k ≤ θ ≤ θ∗∗.
She will drop the case if θ < k.
(ii) u(θ) = 0 and {x∗∗(θ), r∗∗(θ)} = {0, 0} for [θ, θ∗∗];
(iii) u(θ) = − ∫ θ
θ∗∗
{ d
dθ˜
t(x∗∗(θ˜), θ˜)}dθ˜ for θ ∈ [θ∗∗, θ].
Proof. I only give the proof of (i) of the proposition. The proofs of (ii) and (iii) are similar to those in
Proposition 2. Suppose in negation that will go to trial at some θ1 < k in state θ1. Then, the plaintiff earns
net payoff θ1 − k < 0. But she could earn 0 by dropping the case at θ1 while setting x(θ1) = 0 and r(θ1) = 0
without violating conditions (α) and (β). Therefore, going to trial at θ1 < k cannot occur in equilibrium. So
we have arrived at a contradiction. 
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